USA v. Barry Mayo by unknown
2011 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-26-2011 
USA v. Barry Mayo 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Barry Mayo" (2011). 2011 Decisions. 1373. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2011/1373 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2011 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
          NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
________ 
 
No. 10-2405 
_________ 
 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA  
 
v. 
 
BARRY MAYO, 
                              Appellant 
________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. No. 2-09-cr-00177-001) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dickinson R. Debevoise 
 _______ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 25, 2011 
 
Before: SLOVITER, GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
and POLLAK,
*
 District Judge 
(Filed April 26, 2011) 
______ 
 
OPINION 
______ 
 
                                              
*
 Hon. Louis H. Pollak, Senior Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 
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SLOVITER, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Barry Mayo was sentenced to 110 months imprisonment for being a 
felon in possession of a firearm.  He appeals the application of a four-point enhancement 
to the calculation of his Guidelines range and the sufficiency of the District Court’s 
consideration of his plea agreement.
1
  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment and 
sentence. 
I. 
 In 2009, Mayo was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and possession of body armor by a person convicted of 
a violent felony in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 931(a)(1).  In 2010, Mayo and the 
Government entered into a plea agreement on the firearm count and the Government 
agreed to dismiss the body armor count.  The plea agreement contemplated a Guidelines 
range based on an offense level of 21.  The District Court, however, applied a four-point 
enhancement to reach a new offense level of 25 and sentenced Mayo within the 
Guidelines range for that offense level.  The enhancement was for possession of “any 
firearm or ammunition in connection with another felony offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 
2K2.1(b)(6).  The term “another felony offense” may apply to an act “regardless of 
whether a criminal charge was brought, or a conviction obtained.”  U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 app. 
n.14(C).  The other felony offense at issue was possession of body armor by a violent 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.  We have jurisdiction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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felon.  See 18 U.S.C. § 931(a).  Mayo does not deny possession of body armor (a bullet 
proof vest) but denies that his firearm possession was “in connection with” possession of 
the body armor.  He notes that he was shot a few days prior to his arrest and contends that 
he possessed both the firearm and the body armor for self-defense purposes.   
II. 
 We review the District Court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de 
novo.  United States v. Aquino, 555 F.3d 124, 127 (3d Cir. 2009).  However, the District 
Court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts is entitled to “due deference,” Id. at 127 
n.5, and we review that application for abuse of discretion, United States v. Tupone, 442 
F.3d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 Mayo argues that the District Court should not have applied the four-point 
enhancement because there was no evidence of a connection between the possession of 
the firearm and possession of the body armor.  We disagree.  This court construes the 
phrase “in connection with” broadly, noting that it “expresses some relationship or 
association, one that can be satisfied in a number of ways such as a causal or logical 
relation or other type of relationship.”  United States v. Loney, 219 F.3d 281, 284 (3d Cir. 
2000).  The District Court found that Mayo possessed the firearm in connection with 
possessing body armor, “whether he carried the firearm to gain revenge or whether he 
carried it to protect himself.”  App. at 62.  Under either justification, there is a “logical 
relation” between the firearm and the body armor sufficient to satisfy the Loney standard.  
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Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in applying the four-point 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6) and imposing a within-Guidelines sentence. 
III. 
 Mayo also claims that the District Court did not give proper consideration to the 
plea agreement’s contemplation of a total offense level of 21.  This claim lacks merit.  
The District Court need not consider the parties’ suggested sentence when imposing its 
sentence.  See United States v. Schweitzer, 454 F.3d 197, 204 (3d Cir. 2006) (“The 
reasonableness of a sentence depends not on the district court’s adherence to the range 
recommended by . . . the parties.”).  Rather, it must assess the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors 
and impose a reasonable sentence.  Id.  The record in this case reflects the District 
Court’s consideration of those factors when crafting a substantively reasonable sentence.   
IV. 
 For the above-stated reasons, we will affirm the judgment and the sentence. 
